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SHEPPARD V. MAXWELL
THE SUFFICIENCY OF PROBABILITY
JAMES HERNDON*
Thts article continues our dialogue on Fair Trial v Free
Press. The first issue of Volume 41 opened the case m our
Review with arguments presented by Frank Stanton for the
Press and Judge Bernard S. Meyer for the Bar The next
issue of that Volume continued the discussion with contribu-
butLons by Jerome Barron and Donald Gillmor Since then,
Mr Gillmor has published a book on the subject entitled,
appropriately: FAIR TRIAL V FREE PRESS. We would
further refer the reader to the controversial guidelines
recently promulgated by the American Bar Association.
On June 6 of this year the United States Supreme Court held
that Dr Samuel Sheppard was deprived of a fair trial in his con-
viction by an Ohio court for the second-degree murder of his wife.1
The case was remanded to the District Court of the Southern District
of Ohio "with instructions to issue the [writ of habeas corpus]
and order that Sheppard be released from custody unless the State
puts him to its charges again within a reasonable time."' 2 Mr.
Justice Clark, writing for the Court, indicated that the decision
rested on the failure of the trial court to insure sufficient protection
of the accused from the "massive, pervasive and prejudicial pub-
licity that attended his prosecution.""
With its decision in Sheppard the Court has taken yet another
step in attempting to resolve the continuing conflict between con-
stitutional principles of fair trial and free press. The Court is not,
of course, alone in its concern with one of the most perplexing
problems of our constitutional order. Legal literature, as well as
the trade and house organs of the communications media, have in
recent years been increasingly concerned with the fair trial-free
*Associate Professor of Political Science and Coordinator of the Honors Program,
University of North Dakota. A.B. 1952, Indiana University M.A. 1957, Wayne State
University; Ph.D. 1963, University of Michigan.
1. Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333 (1966).
2. Id., at 363.
3. Id., at 335.
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press dilemma. Book length treatments of the issue have appeared
and symposia of various sorts have been conducted in several parts
of the country in an effort to come to some agreeable terms on
how the rights of the press and the criminal defendant may be
balanced in a way disadvantageous to neither Governmental units
from local trial courts to the Senate Subcommittee on Constitutional
Rights have also examined the problem. And associations of those
professionally involved-prosecutors, judges, newspapermen-have
formulated the inevitable "guidelines" to channel their members'
behavior.
Yet the dispute continued. Perhaps the conflict is not subject to
resolution in our open society; perhaps those who ranged themselves
somewhere along or between various proposed solutions were simply
talking past each other; and perhaps most may have simply been
waiting for the authority of a Supreme Court decision.
For all the conflict associated with it, and for all the difficulty
in the arrangement of a solution, the issue itself is fairly simple.
Federal and state governments are forbidden by the First and
Fourteenth Amendments, respectively, to curtail the freedom of the
nation's communication media. The same Constitution that sets such
limits on governments also requires, however, that an accused be
provided with "an impartial jury of the State and district wherein
the crime shall have been committed . ."4 There also exists,
moreover, the requirement that the accused shall have a "speedy
and public trial."5 The conflict that results from the effects of
these various provisions is seen most clearly in the instance of the
commission of particularly heinous crimes of violence. For whatever
reasons, a community's interest in such crimes seems particularly
easy to arouse. And once the interest is present, generally whetted
by the publication of photographic or other accounts of what details
of the crime police investigation may have accumulated, there ap-
pears to develop a corollary interest in apprehension and punishment
of the wrongdoer. In time, as the rite proceeds, someone is arrested.
Something of his biography is generally made available to the public
and reasons that link him to the crime are published. The suspect's
confession, if he made one, might also have been fed into the
public's collection of facts. Shortly afterward, the prosecutor might
on occasion be so generous as to provide the by now slightly less
interested public with some outline of his case against the suspect
and his plans for securing a conviction. Later, the public is informed
of the process of the trial, its more sensational highlights-its clashes
4. U.S. Const., amend. VI
5. M&b
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in combat of articulate counsel-and its ultimate outcome. Justice
has been done and the community, assured that it lives again under
a rule of law, may return to its more mundane activities.
Thus, the public has been alerted to some disturbance in the
social order and its fears raised accordingly for personal safety
or social morality Fears engendered are then normally settled as
assurances are given that the police are at work and, later, that
the culprit has been taken into custody Eventually the judicial
process is placed in public view and whatever additional assurances
that are needed to settle fears still remaining are communicated
as the trial proceeds toward conclusion.
It is proper, of course, that the community be fully informed
that violence has occurred. It is also proper that its fears of ad-
ditional violence be allayed by announcement of the capture of
someone whose responsibility for the initial deed can reasonably
be ascertained. And to accomplish the latter, it is necessary that
some evidence be provided to establish the link. Our concern for a
peaceful social order would seem to warrant dissemination of at
least that much information. Certainly, if words can be taken to
mean what they say, the Constitution would seem to allow no inter-
ference with the publication of material of the sort described here.
Yet, the Constitution requires trial by an impartial jury As
a minimum one would expect that impartiality refers to the lack
of conviction about the guilt of an accused for crimes charged. As
Mr Justice Holmes explained it, "the theory of our system is that
the conclusions to be reached in a case will be induced only by
evidence and argument in open court, and not by any outside in-
fluence, whether of private talk or public print."6 But how do we
guarantee such impartiality when the community, from which the
jury is to be chosen, has already been presented with a case against
the accused? Or, assuming that we could assemble twelve im-
partial jurors, how do we manage to help them to retain any
insulation from out-of-court comment (or "evidence" presented in
the press but inadmissible in court) while the case proceeds?
Answers are found wanting as soon as they are given. The First
Amendment-and the extension of its protections through the Four-
teenth-is alone a sufficient bar to the supression of information.
It is butressed by a simple consideration of public policy that respects
the public's legitimate concern with crime and punishment. And
there is, finally, the Constitution's charge that the trial be public,
to the end, presumably, that convictions made in the absence of
the community's knowledge not be allowed.
6. Patterson v. Colorado, 205 U.S. 454, at 462 (1907).
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At the Forum on the Mass Media, held on October 31, 1964,
at the University of North Dakota, a number of speakers presented
a variety of points of view on the fair trial-free press dilemma. The
remarks of one speaker, New York Supreme Court Justice Bernard
S. Meyer, were subsequently carried in the North Dakota Law
Review In the same issue, Dr Frank Stanton, President of the
Columbia Broadcasting System, presented "the broadcaster's vi-
ew "8 The following issue offered two additional treatments of the
subject, one by Dr Donald M. Gillmor, UND Professor of Journal-
ism, and the other by Mr Jerome A. Barron,' Visiting Associate
Professor of Law at the University
Justice Meyer, stressing that neither right is absolute, wrote
that a balance must prevail and that "to the extent necessary to
protect the individual's right to fair trial, specific limitations of
the free press right are constitutionally permissible."11 He proposed,
accordingly, that serious thought be given by state legislatures to
enactment of a statute that would delay publication of certain
material prejudicial to an accused. Justice Meyer has no wish, of
course, to prevent the disclosure of information to which the public
may have a right, nor is he attempting to hide the work of the
courts from the eyes of the press. Pointing up the unsatisfactory
nature of alternative means of limiting the effects of pre-tnal pub-
licity (e.g., change of venue, continuance, sequestration of jurors,
and the like), Justice Meyer suggests that the proposed statute is
an effective way of securing the balance he feels is necessary
The statute, applicable only to jury trials, would proscribe publi-
cation beginning "with the commission of a crime or the commence-
ment of a civil suit"' 12 and would continue in effect "until trial by
jury is waived, or in a jury case, until the particular material is
admitted in evidence, or, if it is never admitted, until the verdict
is rendered."" The kinds of reportage proscribed as posing "a
serious and imminent danger of substantial prejudice" would include,
first, such material as the fact that an accused had confessed, the
details of his prior criminal record, if any, and statements by officials
respecting the probable guilt of the accused. A second category of
information would be prohibited only if a jury found that its publi-
cation "created such a danger of substantial prejudice." In this
category would fall such items as interviews with a victim's family,
7. Meyer, Free Press v. Fair Trial- The Judge's View, 41 N.D.L. REV. 14 (1964).
8. Stanton, Free Press v. Fair Trail The Broadcaster's View, 41 N.D.L. REV. 7 (1964).
9. Gilmor, Trail by Newspaper and the Social Sciences, 41 N.D.L. Ruv. 157 (1964).
10. Barron, A Constitutional Impasse, 41 N.D.L. Rrv. 177 (1964).
11. Op. cit., supra note 7 at 15.
12. Id., at 21.
13. Ibid.
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disclosures of the probable testimony of particular witnesses, and
material appealing to "racial, political, economic or other bias."
The statute would, in addition, prohibit attorneys and prosecutors,
their respective employees, and employees of the police department
and the courts from providing information whose publication the
statute otherwise forbids.1 '
As might be expected, Dr Stanton would resist the enactment
of any such statute. While believing that "such practices as publi-
cation of alleged confessions, declarations of guilt made by police,
and attempts to try cases in the press, away from the safeguards
of the courtroom, ought to be eliminated in a just society,"' 15 he
does not feel that a statute enforcing delay of publication is the
answer He finds it difficult to determine how a "safe" period of
delay could be established when one is confronted with retrials
and appeals. Dr Stanton also is fearful of the hostility between
the press and the courts "constant judicial inspection" might bring.
He finds that "a residue of bitterness could be highly hazardous
when the public looks for information and guidance to the news
and discussion media" for treatment of judicial elections and appoint-
ments and reporting of "cases and judgments."16
Dr Stanton suggests instead that efforts might be made to
control the behavior more strictly of those police officials, prose-
cutors, and defenders who are the sources of the prejudicial matter
the press may report. Principally, though, he is most concerned
that more study be given to the entire issue and that a chance be
given to responsible men to effect responsible solutions. The whole
area of relationships between the press and government is subject
to continuing scrutiny, he feels. He proposes that the Brookings
Institution might undertake a thorough study of the extent and
justification of government's already existing closed door policies
toward the press, as well as of the journalists' methodologies and
practices in covering the behavior of the institutions of government.
So far from agreeing with the necessity for a statute delaying
publication, Dr Stanton suggests in his concluding remarks that
the rights of free "press" even be extended to permit television
coverage of appellate proceedings, particularly the decision day
sessions of the Supreme Court."7
Professor Barron, in rejecting "easy conclusions that free press
should be in some sense subordinate to fair trial,"1 8 is fully aware
14. Id., at 21-22 (Description of proposed statute).
15. Supra note 8 at 9.
16. Id., at 9-10.
17. Id., at 11-12.
18. Supra note 10 at 179.
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of the potential of the press, including television, to serve as a
means to link citizenry and government. Yet, he also points to the
serious damage the press may do to the cause of an accused, and
as the circumstances surrounding President Kennedy's assassination
demonstrated, how the press may actually become a party to the
events it purports only to describe. As Professor Barron perceives
the problem, then, "the task is one of reconciliation and accom-
modation rather than one of choice or subordination." 19
Justice Meyer's proposed statute, as a means to reconciliation
and accommodation, receives some support from Professor Barron.
He finds, in particular, that to the extent that the statute reaches
not only representatives of the press but policemen and attorneys
as well, it provides "a most stimulating deterrent" to the dissemi-
nation of prejudicial publicity He adds that, "inasmuch as judges
may be equally liable to the effects of such publicity, the statute
should extend in its coverage to non-jury trials." Despite his general
support for Justice Meyer's proposal, however, Professor Barron
advises against excessive reliance on a statute. Though he does
not say so explicitly, he seems to feel that the possibilities of the
contempt power may be open to further exploration. He suggests
at one point that the narrow holding in Bridges v California 2 0
limiting use of the contempt power to those situations in which
published material poses a "clear and present danger" of obstructing
justice, might be reconsidered. He closes with an admonition that
we reflect on Justice Frankfurter's dissent in Bridges: "The need
is great that courts be criticized, but just as great that they be
allowed to do their duty ",21
Dr Gillmor, contrary to the tack taken by the other writers,
is little concerned with the efficacy of one solution of the fair trial-
free press problem as against some other He asks whether we
know enough yet to posit any relationship between published accounts
of a case and the reactions and decisions of jurors who must
eventually sit in judgement. "What is the effect of trial and pre-trial
publicity on jurors? ' 2  he asks. After reviewing the available re-
search on what nexus there may be between press accounts and jury
decisions, Professor Gillmor writes that "if a tentative conclusion
may be ventured at this point, it is that there is no empirical
evidence to support the view that extensive, or even irresponsible,
press coverage of a court case destroys the ability of jurors to
decide the issue fairly "2,3 Nevertheless, Dr Gillmor advises self-
19. Ibid.
20. 314 U.S. 252 (1941).
21. Id., at 284 quoted in Barron, supra, at 184.
22. Gillmor, Trial by Newspaper and the Soctal Smence, 41 N.D.L. REv. (1964).
23. Id., at 172.
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restraint on the part of the press in those instances in which already
existing community bias toward an accused might be reinforced
by press comment or reporting adverse to the accused. In any
event, because of the scanty knowledge we have of the news media's
influence on jury deliberations, Dr Gillmor asks that there be
"systematic study of the free press-fair trial complex before either
legislation or any angry revival of the contempt power is imposed
upon it. '124
Responsible men, then, may disagree. The dilemma posed by
equally precious rights in head-on collision is clearly recognized by
all, yet proposed solutions, for a variety of reasons, gain little assent.
Has the Supreme Court done any better>
There are, it would appear, three separate sorts of situations
involving free press and fair trial with which the Court has dealt.
One of these concerns the extent to which the press may comment
critically or report critical comments on the conduct of a trial and
thereby seek to influence the behavior of a judge. A second set of
cases has treated the permissible degree to which press coverage-
as well as other forms of expression-may affect the physical con-
ditions of trial. The third situation is, of course, that of trial and
pre-trial publicity
Critical comment directed at a court seems now to have a wider
permissible range than formerly Arguing that influences extraneous
to the courtroom are to be minimized, the Supreme Court upheld
in 1907 a contempt conviction based on publication of articles and
a cartoon critical of the Colorado Supreme Court.25 "When a case is
finished," Mr Justice Holmes wrote for the Court, "courts are subject
to the same criticism as other people, but the propriety and necessity
of preventing interference with the course of justice by premature
statement, argument or intimidation hardly can be denied. ' 26
In Toledo Newspaper Co. v United States,27 decided in 1918,
the Court upheld a summary contempt for publications critical of
a federal district court. And here the Court spelled out more clearly
than it had in Patterson how it would determine whether a given
publication could be held to obstruct justice: "the situation is con-
trolled by the reasonable tendencies of the acts done and not by
extreme and substantially impossible assumptions on the subject. 28
The Court said further: "In other words, having regard to the
powers conferred, to the protection of society, to the honest and
24. Ibtd.
25. Patterson v. Colorado, 205 U.S. 454, at 462 (1907).
26. Id., at 463.
27. 247 U.S. 402 (1918).
28. Id., at 421.
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fair admimstration of justice and to the evil to come from its
obstruction, the wrong depends upon the tendency of the acts to
accomplish this result without reference to the consideration of how
far they may have been without influence m a particular case."'"
The test of reasonable tendency was not to last however 80 In
1941, in Bridges v California,31 the Court determined that Bridges
had been improperly convicted for contempt since the published
comments he had made pertaining to pending litigation did not
present a "clear and present danger" of obstructing justice. Apply-
ing standards developed in other cases32 having to do with freedom
of speech and press, the Court held that, "neither 'inherent tendency'
nor 'reasonable tendency' is enough to justify a restriction of free
expression."' 8
The Bridges rule was affirmed in two later cases, Pennekamp
v Florida" and Craig v Harney.3 5 The opinions in both cases
stressed the necessity for the danger posed by press comment to
be imminent and not merely "likely " Further, both opinions drew
a distinction between juries and judges and suggested that judges,
as men of strength, ought to be able to take adverse comment in
their stride. As the Court said in Craig, "but the law of contempt
is not made for the protection of judges who may be sensitive to
the winds of public opinion. Judges are supposed to be men of
fortitude, able to thrive in hardy climate."506
In the most recent episode involving use of the contempt power
to punish critical comment, the Bridges rule appears to remain
intact. Wood, a Georgia county sheriff, had published articles highly
critical of county judges who had convened a grand jury to investi-
gate charges of Negro "bloc voting." It was indicated explicitly by
Wood, moreover, that he intended that his comments would influence
the deliberations of the grand jury The Supreme Court found, how-
ever, no clear and present danger to the administration of justice
in Wood's comments and ordered his contempt conviction reversed.8
7
It appears, then, that though use of the contempt power is not
barred to judges confronted with a hostile or aggressive press, its
29. Ibd.
30. Nye v. U.S., 313 U.S. 33 (1941) (Court had already corrected what it considered
an improper enlargement in Toledo Newspaper Co., Inc. v. U.S. of the area within which
summary punishment for contempt would be exercised. See 4 Stat. 487 (1831).
31. 314 U.S. 252 (1941).
32. Schenck v. U.S., 249 U.S. 47 (1919) Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925),
Abrams v. U.S., 250 U.S. 616 (1919), Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357 (1927) Herndon
v. Lowry, 301 U.S. 242 (1937) , Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940).
33. Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252, at 273 (1941).
34. 328 U.S. 331 (1946).
3N. 331 U.S. 367 (1947).
36. Id., at 876.
37. Wood v. Georgia, 370 U.S. 375 (1962).
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use is very narrowly restricted to those situations in which the
press constitutes an immediate and obvious peril to the proper
workings of the court. One may very properly question, though,
whether the printed word can ever present such a peril, especially
if the Supreme Court's reasoning on the fortitude of trial judges
is accepted.
Aside from the influence that trial and pre-trial publicity may
have on jurors, then, the only threat posed by the press lies in
its efforts to cover trial proceedings. If the printed word is held
to be without serious adverse effect on judges there is simply no
other activity of the press that can operate to interfere with the
processes of justice.
That judges have an obligation to keep the courtroom free of
tumult and indecorum has long been settled.38 That considerations
of free speech do not override that obligation, moreover, seems
clear from a recent cases9 involving picketing outside a courthouse.
Appellants had been convicted of violating a state statute prohibit-
ing picketing or parading near a courthouse and had challenged
their conviction on grounds, inter alia, that the statute on its face
interfered with rights of free speech. They also contended that as
applied the statute deprived them of free speech since there was
no showing that their acts produced a clear and present danger
of obstructing justice. With respect to the statute itself, the Court
replied:
A state may adopt safeguards necessary and appropriate to
assure that the administration of justice at all stages is free
from outside control and influence. A narrowly drawn statute
such as the one under review is obviously a safeguard
both necessary and appropriate to vindicate the State's in-
terest in assuring justice under law.40
Regarding clear and present danger the Court said:
Even assuming the applicability of a general clear and
present danger test, it is one thing to conclude that the
mere publication of a newspaper editorial or a telegram to
a Secretary of Labor, however critical of a court, presents
no clear and present danger to the administration of justice
and quite another thing to conclude that crowds, such as
this, demonstrating before a courthouse may not be prohib-
ited by a legislative determination based on experience that
such conduct inherently threatens the judicial process. We
therefore reject the clear and present danger argument of
appellant.41
38. See, e.g., Moore v. Dempsey, 261 U.S. 86 (1923).
39. Cox v. Louisiana, 879 U.S. 559 (1965).
40. Id., at 562.
NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW
Though neither press comment nor coverage is involved here, it
would not be difficult for the Court to extend its holding in Cox
to cover the behavior of newsmen at a trial. One might contend,
indeed, that such an extension was made in the Court's reversal
of Texas financier Billie Sol Estes' conviction for swindling." Here
the Court found that the intrusion of television cameras into the
courtroom-even though permitted by state law-was prejudicial to
the accused. Moreover, the opinion indicates that the Court is not
disposed to require any actual showing of prejudice. That a poss-
ibility of injury to the accused is present seems sufficient to bar
cameras from the courtroom.4 3
Taken together with Cox, the Estes decision suggests that the
Court is concerned to guarantee trials antiseptically free of unwel-
come influences and that its decisions here are not likely to be
tempered by free speech considerations. A demonstration of pre-
judice is not necessary-as both cases seem to indicate-nor is a
prior legislative determination essential as was present in Cox (and
heavily relied upon there) but missing in Estes. Indeed, if anything,
Estes would seem to hold that legislative determinations authorizing
what the Court perceives to be prejudicial may simply be overlooked.
The third, and for present purposes most important, of the
strains in the fair trial-free press cases is that having to do with
prejudicial trial and pre-trial publicity In this area, as will be seen,
the Court has moved a full one hundred eighty degrees in its think-
ing. In an early case, Holt v United States,44 the Court held that
even though during the course of trial jurors had seen newspaper
articles adverse to the interests of the accused, the trial was not
on that account unjust and that the conviction of the accused for
murder would stand. Mr Justice Holmes, speaking for the !Court,
wrote, "if the mere opportunity for prejudice or corruption is to
raise a presumption that they exist, it will be hard to maintain jury
trial under the conditions of the present day ",45 A similar result
was reached some forty-two years later in Stroble v California.6
Here the Court indicated that, concerning the publication of peti-
tioner's confession, he had "not shown how the publication of a
portion of that confession four days earlier prejudiced the jury in
arrivmg at their verdict two months thereafter ,,47 Beyond this,
though, and with respect to newspaper accounts which described
41. Id., at 566.
42. Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532 (1965).
43. Id., at 545-549 (See discussion).
44. 218 U.S. 245 (1910).
45. Id., at 251.
46. 343 U.S. 181 (1952).
47. Id., at 193.
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Stroble as a "werewolf," a "fiend," and a "sex-mad killer, '4 8 the
Court found itself unable to say that petitioner was deprived of due
process of law, "at least where, as here, the inflammatory newspaper
accounts appeared approximately six weeks before the beginning
of petitioner's trial, and there is no affirmative showing that any
community prejudice ever existed or in any way affected the de-
liberation of the jury ",,9
In these cases the Court admitted that publicity could be pre-
judicial to an accused, yet it found nothing in the facts to warrant
a conclusion that newspaper accounts had aroused "such prejudice
in the community that petitioner's trial was 'fatally infected' with
an absence of 'that fundamental fairness essential to the very con-
cept of justice.' "50 Within a decade, however, the Court was able
to discover at both the federal and state levels prejudice to an ac-
cused in newspaper accounts. In Marshall v United States,5 1 the
Court reversed a conviction for unlawful dispensing of drugs on
grounds that four jurors had read newspaper reports of government
evidence indicating that petitioner had previously practiced medicine
without a license-evidence that had already been excluded from
the trial as both immaterial and prejudicial. As the Court said in
its per curiam opinion, "the prejudice to the defendant is almost
certain to be as great when that evidence reaches the jury through
news accounts as when it is a part of the prosecution's evidence."5 2
The first reversal of a state conviction attended by prejudicial
publicity occurred in Irwin v Dowd,53 decided in 1961. Here eight
of the twelve jurors had indicated before the trial began that they
thought Irwin was guilty but that nevertheless they could render
an impartial hearing. Their views concerning Irwin's guilt were
based, apparently, on extensive radio, television, and press accounts
of and commentary on the details of the case. The prosecutor and
police officials had also issued releases to the press saying that
the accused had confessed to six other murders.
The Court, stressing that the "right to jury trial guarantees to
the criminally accused a fair trial by a panel of impartial, 'indif-
ferent' jurors,' 54 determined that since two-thirds of the jury poss-
essed a belief in the accused's guilt, he had not been given a fair
trial. The court added, though, that:
[T]o hold that the mere existence of any preconceived
48. Id., at 192.
49. Id., at 195.
50. 1d., at 191-192, quoting Lisenba v. California, 314 U.S. 219, at 236 (1941).
51. 360 U.S. 210 (1959).
52. Id., at 312-313.
53. 366 U.S. 717 (1961).
54. Id.. at 722.
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notion as to the guilt or innocence of an accused, without
more, is sufficient to rebut the presumption of a prospective
juror's impartiality would be to establish an impossible
standard. It is sufficient if the juror can lay aside his im-
pression or opinion and render a verdict based on the evi-
dence presented in court.25
But with respect only to the present case, the Court expressed
its belief that "with such an opinion permeating their minds, it
would be difficult to say that each could exclude this preconception
of guilt from his deliberations. The influence that lurks in an opinion
once formed is so persistent that it unconsciously fights detachment
from the mental processes of the average man.15 6
In the following year the Supreme Court declined to reverse
a grand larceny conviction for reasons of prejudicial publicity 57
Acknowledging that much adverse reportage and commentary had
accompanied Teamster president Dave Beck's various confrontations
with the law, the Court found that jurors had lain aside whatever
prejudice they may have had and that, in the language of Irwin,
this was "sufficient. '" 58
Taken by themselves, these cases would seem to point to the
Court's realization of a probability of prejudice to an accused in
the publication of adverse information or commentary but allow-
ing that probability to be discounted in the event that some show-
ing could be made that jurors were without prejudice. The Court
seems to have been disposed, in other words, to posit a link between
prejudice and publicity as an assumption to be overcome. Yet,
that the assumption could be overcome, as in Beck, suggests that
the Court had not hardened its views in this area to the extent
that it would later in the matter of television in the courtroom.
Unlike its decision in Estes, in which the possibility of prejudice
appears sufficient to reverse a conviction, the Court was still will-
ing, at least as late as Beck, to admit some distinction between
possibility and high probability or certainty
That willingness was seriously weakened in 1963 in the Court's
reversal of a murder conviction in Rzdeau v Louistana.5 9 An
"interview" of Rideau by the county sheriff, in which Rideau ad-
mitted robbery, kidnapping, and murder, had been recorded on video
tape and then televised several times in the locality within which
Rideau was to be tried. At least three of the jurors had seen this
televised "interview."
55. Id., at 723.
56. Id., at 727.
57. Beck v. Washington, 369 U.S. 541 (1962).
58. Id., at 557.
59. 373 U.S. 723 (1963).
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The trial court's denial of a request for change of venue led to
reversal by the Supreme Court. Noting that Rideau's trial was the
televised interview-without benefit of counsel or judge-the Court
concluded that the accused had been deprived of due process. 60
Due process, the Court stated, requires "trial before a jury drawn
from a community of people who had not seen and heard Rideau's
televised 'interview ' "1,1
This case could, of course, fit well within the bounds set by
the opinions in Marshall, Irwin, and Beck. An association of prej-
udice and publicity could be assumed to exist until some satis-
faction is given that the jurors were able to set aside whatever
ideas they had formed relative to the case being tried. In the pres-
ent instance one would imagine that no such satisfaction was even
sought. Yet, precisely the opposite is true. As Justices Clark and
Harlan point out in their vigorous dissent, the jurors who had seen
the interview testified that they would not be affected by it.62 The
dissenters also challenged the Court's characterization of Rideau's
interview as a trial:
Unless the adverse publicity is shown by the record to have
fatally infected the trial, there is simply no basis for the
Court's inference that the publicity epitomized by the tele-
vised interview, called up some informal and illicit analogy
to res judicata, making petitioner's trial a meaningless
formality 68
With Rideau, the link between prejudice and publicity has been
made stronger and to break it requires a good deal more, apparent-
ly, than the mere assurances of jurors to the contrary The Court
itself, as Rideau considered with the other cases seems to make
clear, is finally the judge of what prejudice there may be in a
given case. And there would appear to be less inclination now than
earlier actually to search out the empirical bases for tying publicity
and prejudice together; the Court seems to have been willing here,
as it was two years later in Estes, merely to assume a necessary
relationship rather than asking for some demonstration of that re-
lationship. The possibility of prejudice, initially an assumption to
be overcome, is raised to high probability in circumstances which
only the Court, ultimately, may determine to exist or not to exist.
What then of Sheppard v Maxwell?
Fully half of Justice Clark's opinion for the majority is given
60. Id., at 726.
61. Id., at 727.
62. Id., at 732.
63. Id., at 729.
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over to a recounting of details of the crime, Sheppard's trial, and
coverage both of the pre-trial events and the trial itself by the local
news media. Through this recounting we are given a view of an
intensely hostile and aggressive press, operating at its sensational
worst. Through disclosure of material adverse to Sheppard-some
of it never introduced at the trial, through innuendo, and eventually,
through demands for Sheppard's prosecution-the news media built
their case. At the trial, representatives of the press crowded into
virtually all available space in and around the courtroom, consti-
tuting at the very least a physical nuisance. Meanwhile their reports
continued to appear in an ever tighter case against Sheppard-in
the press. When the role of the news media was challenged by
defense counsel-as it was frequently-the court simply admonished
the jury to confine its understanding to matters raised in the court-
room. Motions for change of venue, continuance, and mistrial were
all denied.
In the Supreme Court's view, the "totality of circumstances in
this case" clearly warranted reversal. Citing the "virulent publicity"
that appeared before the trial but unable to rely on that alone, the
Court was most disturbed by the conditions of the trial and its
attendant publicity "The fact is," the Court wrote, "that bedlam
reigned at the courthouse during the trial and newsmen took over
practically the entire courtroom, hounding most of the participants
in the trial, especially Sheppard. ' 64 The Court went on to point up
the prejudicial nature of the news reports emanating from the trial
and expressed its view that "this deluge of publicity reached at
least some of the jury "65 Accordingly, the Court "concluded that
Sheppard did not receive a fair trial consistent with the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and, therefore, reverse[d] the
judgement. "66
To this point the opinion does not appear particularly exceptional.
Jurors may be prejudiced by the press, and if they are due process
has been denied. The weight of circumstances in this case indicates
a high probability that jurors were so prejudiced, therefor reversal
is in order The Court neither required nor was given any empirical
demonstration that prejudice did exist or that, if it existed, it was
occasioned by the press. Circumstances and probabilistic determi-
nations from those circumstances are sufficient. Sheppard, then lies
well within the framework set by the rulings in Rideau (and prior
cases) and Estes.
64. Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, at 355 (1966).
65. Id., at 357.
66. Id.. at 335.
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There is, however, at least one distinctive element in Sheppard.
Though at pains to register its dissatisfaction with sensationalism
in the news media, the Court assigns primary responsibility to the
trial court for denial to the accused of due process. The press could
not, of course, have been reached in this case by the Supreme
Court's opinion, and it is not unusual for the high Court to criticize
lower court proceedings or to find trial judges lacking in their
appreciation for the rights of a criminal defendant. Yet, the very
force of language in the Court's opinion is suggestive. There is no
mistaking the Court's displeasure with the conduct of the trial, nor
is there any attempt to respect the sensibilities of those responsible.
Beyond this, however, the Court goes to considerably greater
lengths than formerly to point out just what errors were committed
and how they could properly have been avoided. In so doing, the
Court has prepared a virtual blueprint for the conduct of trials
likely to be attended by extensive publicity 67
There is, to be sure, some judicial hand-wringing over the
necessity for reversals, but the Court has marked, probably as
clearly as it can, the extent of its concern for trials free of prejudicial
interference by the press and the necessity for that interference
to be restricted at the trial court level. Though these considerations
should have been apparent in earlier decisions, they evidently were
not. As the Court remarks, "from the cases coming here we note
that unfair and prejudicial news comment on pending trials has
become increasingly prevalent. ' 6 Sheppard may be the Court's
last patient effort to reverse the trend. To the extent that it is, it
should stand as a decision of crucial significance.
Sheppard has other implications as well. There is, of course,
no mention of the kind of statute proposed by Justice Meyer, but
given the clear-cut assignment of responsibility for fair trial to the
local level, it is not inconceivable that the Court would look with
favor on the efforts of a legislature to assist a judge in doing the
job the Court expects. Somewhat the same thing might be said
with respect to Professor Barron's suggested re-examination of the
contempt power We might, at least, look to some exploration of
these alternatives should the Court's views in Sheppard be ignored,
or acknowledged, found wanting.
As a social scientist, this writer obviously shares Dr Gillmor's
position that some further research is essential before the link be-
tween publicity and prejudice can finally be forged. Yet, the Court
is not of such a mind. Presently probabilities are enough as the
67. Id., at 357-362.
68. Id., at 362.
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Court's quotation with approval both in Estes and Sheppard of
language from In re Murchison should indicate: "Our system of
law has always endeavored to prevent even the probability of
unfairness. "6 9
And that probability is enough, along with the simple fact of
rulings adverse to the press in recent cases, should warrant perhaps
one more inference. One must assume from its language in these
cases as well as from its decisions in other cases that the Supreme
Court is fully cognizant of the values of a free press and as com-
mitted as ever to its maintainance within our society But where
news media threaten fair trial, one must assume, at least for the
present, that the weight of the Court will be thrown against the
privilege of free press. Local judges, under the distant supervision
of federal courts, are to be the instrument and the criminal defendant
is to be the immediate beneficiary
Yet, no one can profit ultimately from this arrangement. Society's
interests are hardly well served either through continued reversals
or through necessary suppression of information. The "constant
judicial inspection" cited by Dr Stanton is certainly contrary to
the traditions of an open society Most importantly, however, this
scheme is probably as unworkable as it is undesirable. The press
is simply and for good reason unlikely to be denied. Economic
considerations, intellectual and emotional fidelity to the First Amend-
ment, and the newsman's drive to do the job for which he is
trained and paid all work to weaken the range of procedural
guarantees courts may erect.
In the end, then, we are all ultimately at the mercy of the
press. Is it too much, or too soon, to ask that that high charge be
met by editors and publishers with respect not only for the interests
of their readers and stockholders but as well for those of the litigant
and the judicial office?
69. In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, at 136 (1955) (quoted in Sheppard v. Maxwell,
supra note 64 at 357).
